Pulse/docs/PRODUCTION_SECURITY.md
rcourtman 8a99b16d6c docs: correct customer docs that drifted from the source
Audited the customer-facing docs against the code: about 5,200 concrete
claims (env vars, endpoints, flags, defaults, ports, UI labels), plus every
environment variable the code reads. Each discrepancy was re-verified
against the source before editing, and every edit was reviewed again.

What users would have hit following the old text:
- UI paths and labels that no longer exist (Settings > Relay, Platform
  connections, Access Control, SSO Providers, Create Organization) and
  Patrol mode names (now Ask first, Safe auto-fix, Autopilot).
- Wrong values and behaviour: LOG_MAX_AGE=0 does not disable cleanup,
  Patrol evidence budget is 10 calls and 12 turns, ALLOW_UNPROTECTED_EXPORT
  covers private networks too, PULSE_AUDIT_ASYNC defaults on.
- Agent install: install.sh ignores PULSE_ENABLE_KUBERNETES and
  PULSE_ENABLE_PROXMOX, rejects --disable-auto-update, and the token
  fallback lives in the state directory.
- API: audit endpoints answer 402 on Community, onboarding QR is GET,
  type=container is rejected, several routes need admin plus a scope.
- HTTP_REDIRECT_PORT was not documented anywhere.

Docs are mirrored under frontend-modern/public/docs, so each change is
applied to both copies. The tests that pinned the old wording (including
three that asserted claims the code contradicts) are updated alongside.

Contract-Neutral: Customer docs corrected to match shipped behaviour; no runtime, API or contract change.
2026-10-11 13:59:56 +01:00

14 KiB

Production Deployment and Security

This guide answers the questions that matter before connecting Pulse to a production or multi-cluster estate: whether it needs root, what it can change, what it scans, how credentials and updates are handled, what Community includes, and what scale has actually been tested.

The short version is: start with API-only monitoring and add privileged agents only where the extra telemetry is worth the additional trust. Pulse does not require an agent on every Proxmox host to monitor normal cluster inventory, utilization, storage, guests, and status.

Choose the least-privileged collection path

Collection path and coverage Privilege boundary
Proxmox API only: PVE, PBS, and PMG inventory; node and guest state; storage usage; and normal API metrics No Pulse software runs on the Proxmox host. Use a dedicated read-only or narrowly scoped API token.
Proxmox API plus host agent: API coverage plus host-local SMART, temperatures, ZFS/Ceph/mdadm detail, arbitrary mount capacity, and full LXC filesystem capacity The Linux agent runs as root by default for the supported full-telemetry profile.
Guest-local agent: Host metrics and optional Docker/Podman inventory inside a VM or LXC The agent is trusted inside that guest only; it does not grant Pulse access to the hypervisor.

For most Proxmox installations, begin with Settings → Infrastructure (Add infrastructure). Add a host agent only after identifying a metric that the Proxmox API cannot provide. The complete capability matrix is in Agent Security.

API-only does not mean no guest-agent commands. Pulse can request VM filesystem and memory readings through Proxmox's QEMU Guest Agent API without a Pulse agent installed. Those reads share the channel used by freeze-enabled backups. For an affected installation, follow the backup safety precaution, including the actual Pulse server and automatic updaters; stopping only a Pulse agent is not enough. An OK backup task does not prove guest thaw or application recovery. Do not run a backup or guest-agent probe just to test the monitoring setup.

Generated Proxmox API setup uses a separate pulse-monitor account and token with monitoring ACLs. Review the generated script before running it, especially if your organization maintains its own Proxmox roles. Do not reuse an administrator's interactive account or a token that has unrelated write permissions.

What trusting a root agent means

Pulse's Linux/systemd agent runs as root by default because SMART devices, temperature sensors, Docker or Podman sockets, host-local storage state, and some platform integrations require root or equivalent access. That is a real security boundary, not a cosmetic implementation detail.

The fresh-install posture limits that boundary:

  • the service is marked monitoring-only, remote configuration cannot promote it, and its credential omits agent:exec;
  • the health and Prometheus listener binds to 127.0.0.1:9191 by default;
  • generated systemd units apply service hardening including NoNewPrivileges=true, private temporary storage, and kernel/control-group write protection;
  • an agent reports to one authoritative Pulse server; additional observer connections are report-only;
  • Proxmox guest Docker inventory through pct exec is disabled by default and requires an explicit server setting.

The advanced legacy combined command profile is a separate trust decision. It marks the root collector command-capable and gives its credential execution scope so the same process can accept governed server requests. Existing unmarked installations remain in a visible legacy compatibility state during the migration. Agent Doctor reports both local authority and credential scope so an over-scoped monitoring install is not mistaken for a safe default.

On standard Linux systemd hosts the installer also offers a supported least-privilege profile: --least-privilege runs the service as a dedicated pulse-agent system user, with optional --grant-smart and --grant-pct flags that restore SMART and Proxmox LXC filesystem collection through exact-command sudoers grants. Command execution and pct exec guest inventory stay root-profile features. If API data is sufficient, API-only monitoring remains the cleanest least-privilege choice of all — it needs no agent.

See Agent Security for the precise command, guest-access, update, and service-hardening boundaries.

Discovery and network access

Network discovery is disabled by default (DISCOVERY_ENABLED=false). Pulse does not need discovery once you have configured known platform connections.

When enabled, discovery probes Proxmox service ports 8006 and 8007 across the selected address range. It does not perform a general all-port scan. The scan is bounded by configurable subnet allowlists and blocklists, a default maximum of 1,024 hosts per run, 50 concurrent probes, and one- and two-second dial and HTTP timeouts. In a fixed production inventory, leave it off. If you do use it, set an explicit allowlist rather than relying on automatic subnet selection.

Normal network paths are:

  • Pulse server → Proxmox API over HTTPS;
  • agent → Pulse server for enrollment, reports, configuration, and updates;
  • browser → Pulse web UI/API, preferably through HTTPS or a trusted reverse proxy.

For agents crossing an untrusted network, use HTTPS and consider the split-port agent ingest mode so the agent control plane can be firewalled separately from the web UI and management API.

Credentials, authentication, and data

  • Complete the bootstrap-token flow and keep authentication enabled. Do not expose an unfinished first-run setup to an untrusted network.
  • Pulse encrypts stored platform credentials with AES-256-GCM. Back up the encryption key with the data directory; without it, encrypted configuration cannot be recovered.
  • Use a separate API token for each platform or trust boundary. Grant only the permissions Pulse needs, and rotate a token before revoking the credential currently used by a live connection or agent.
  • Do not put host SSH private keys in a Pulse Docker or LXC container. Pulse logs a security warning when it collects temperatures over SSH from a container but still uses the key; use API-only monitoring or a host-local agent instead.
  • Restrict the Pulse data directory and backups as secrets. They contain encrypted credentials as well as sessions, API-token state, and the key material needed by the installation.

The canonical disclosure, reporting process, and hardening checklist are in the Security Policy. Data and optional telemetry behavior are covered in Privacy.

Installation and update integrity

For a controlled production installation:

  1. Record the current server version, edition and deployment configuration. Choose an exact target release rather than latest, and retain a consistent private backup of the actual data, matching keys and any external stores. See update and rollback boundaries: replacing a binary or image does not reverse data migrations.
  2. Obtain the correct server edition. Public GitHub release archives and the public Docker image are Community builds, even with an activation key. Paid Pro, continuing Relay and legacy customers must use their private Pro image or archive from the existing download route. Do not replace an installed paid runtime with a public build during an update.
  3. For a Community server installation, download install.sh and install.sh.sshsig from the exact release. Verify the installer with the published Ed25519 installer key and the pulse-install namespace before running it with that same pinned version. Follow the edition-appropriate installation instructions, not a substitute installer.
  4. Install or upgrade agents with the per-host command shown by your own Pulse server under Settings → Infrastructure → Install on a host.

The agent update path requires a server-provided SHA-256 checksum. Release builds with embedded trusted update keys also require a valid Ed25519 signature before replacing the running binary, then validate the executable and run its self-test before the atomic swap.

Piping any network-fetched shell script into a root shell grants that script root at that moment. The signature-verified, version-pinned flow exists so you can verify the installer before execution. See Installation and Agent Security for the commands and the documented v5-to-v6 first-update limitation.

Community and Pro boundaries

Current self-hosted plans do not sell monitoring capacity by node, VM, container, or other child-resource volume. Community includes core self-hosted monitoring and seven days of metric history. Pro adds 90-day history, Patrol investigation and governed fixes, RBAC, audit logging, reporting and centralized agent profiles. SSO is included with Community and higher tiers.

Relay is no longer sold. Pulse Mobile and Relay retire on 31 March 2027. Existing paired phones keep working until then; continuing Relay subscribers receive Pro features at their current price for as long as their subscription continues, including after the app retires. Relay connects the app, not the web UI. Use your own VPN or tunnel for remote web access. For alerts on your phone afterwards, add an ntfy, Gotify or Pushover destination under Alerts and open Pulse in your phone's browser. See Relay / Pulse Mobile for existing pairing and security details; do not plan a new deployment around the retiring app.

That means an estate with 50 Proxmox hosts does not need Pro merely to add the fiftieth host. Review the current Plans and Entitlements for the runtime-aligned feature boundary.

What the scale evidence proves

Pulse has repeatable automated performance coverage for a simulated 500-node Proxmox estate. The API load suite builds 500 nodes plus 2,500 VMs (3,000 resources) and exercises concurrent resource, metrics-history, dashboard, and mixed-endpoint workloads. The metrics-store suite separately exercises 500 nodes, 2,000 metric series, concurrent dashboard readers, continuous writes, rollups, retention, and query-latency budgets.

Those tests are regression evidence, not a blanket certification of every 500-node topology. Real capacity also depends on guest count, polling interval, history retention, storage latency, enabled integrations, alert rules, and the resources assigned to Pulse. A 50-host operator should still stage the rollout and measure their own workload.

Production rollout checklist

  • Put Pulse on a dedicated VM, container, Kubernetes deployment, or host with durable storage and tested backups.
  • Pin and verify the server release before installation.
  • Preserve the server edition, matching keys and deployment configuration when updating; a public Community build does not supply the private Pro runtime.
  • Enable HTTPS and restrict web/API access at the firewall or reverse proxy.
  • Start with a dedicated Proxmox API token and no host agents.
  • Leave discovery disabled, or constrain it to an explicit subnet allowlist for a temporary discovery run.
  • Confirm inventory, storage, backup, replication, and alert behavior on one cluster before adding the rest.
  • Add root agents only to hosts that need specific local telemetry; keep commands disabled unless there is a reviewed operational need.
  • Check existing inventory and provider identity before adding another cluster; matching node names or VMIDs do not establish the same resource. See multiple installations.
  • Exercise disruptive failure, upgrade and restore scenarios only on an isolated non-production fixture with independent monitoring and a recovery path. Do not induce node loss, a failed backup, a full disk or an alert storm on live workloads as a rollout check. Normal Test notification success does not establish ordinary, grouped or resolved alert delivery.
  • For affected freeze-enabled Proxmox backups, follow the backup safety precaution above. Keep monitoring paused until independent checks confirm thaw, fresh successful writes to every covered filesystem and workload liveness; restore only services and timers active before the pause. Arrange independent outage coverage while Pulse monitoring and alerts are unavailable.
  • Observe CPU, memory, database size, write rate, and dashboard latency during normal staged operation. Keep measurement windows and resource limits comparable; database size is not a write rate. Do not prune history or change polling to hide a fault; use performance guidance.
  • Record the Pulse version, enabled integrations, privileges, exposed ports, backup location, and rollback procedure in the site's runbook.

Pulse is intended to be the operational monitoring layer for the platforms it supports. It is not a SIEM, a general log-ingestion platform, or a substitute for an organization's incident escalation and change-control process.

Independent review

Pulse does not currently claim an independent security certification. The Security Review Scope maps the main trust boundaries to source files, tests, reproducible baseline commands, and the private disclosure channel so external reviewers can evaluate concrete behavior rather than marketing claims.