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Remote Control blocked `/previews/*`, so a phone or browser paired through the tunnel had no web preview at all: the entry was hidden and the agent's dev server stayed out of reach. Previews now work there, behind a host setting that is on by default. A preview's sandboxed document sends neither the device cookie nor a usable `Origin`, so the Remote Control gate admits a live `/previews/<token>/…` capability on its token alone, as local listeners already do, while the host's Web previews switch is on. The ingress, which refused every WebSocket, now admits preview upgrades only: `admitRemoteUpgrade()` parses the target exactly as the preview proxy does and the manager hands the socket to the application's path-preview upgrade handler, never to the shared upgrade event (so `/previews/<token>/../../sidecars/…` cannot reach another handler). Every other upgrade still gets 404. The switch lives in Settings → Remote Access → Remote Control. Only the host can change it (`PUT /api/remote-control/previews`); the registry stores only the opt-out. Turning it off refuses later preview requests, including the Referer-based root-relative asset fallback, and closes live preview WebSockets; remote `/api/meta` then reports `previewsUnavailable`, which hides Open web preview on paired devices. Exposing previews through a public tunnel makes their address a bearer credential, so path-proxied preview responses now carry `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` with the iframe's own flags (one shared constant, `previews/sandbox.ts`) and `Referrer-Policy: same-origin`, on every content type. A preview document opened outside its iframe stays an opaque origin instead of running with CodeNomad's origin and device cookie, and the capability path stays out of Referer headers to other sites. Such a standalone document then behaves like the preview iframe: its root-relative resources rely on the runtime bridge's path rewriting, without the Referer fallback. The per-token preview.localhost host keeps its own origin and headers. Help (Remote Control, mobile and client overview pages, all ten locales), dev-docs/REMOTE_CONTROL.md, architecture.md and UI_SHELL.md describe the behavior; the switch label and caption are translated in all locales. Validation: a Remote Control surface test drives the real application through the ingress: a preview page and an `Origin: null` form post work without a device cookie and carry the sandbox and referrer headers, unknown tokens and non-preview or dot-segment upgrades get 404, a preview WebSocket upgrades, a paired device cannot change the switch, and turning it off closes the live WebSocket, refuses the preview and its Referer asset fallback, and flags the metadata. Registry, metadata and proxy tests cover persistence of the opt-out, the flag and the headers per entry point; browser tests cover the switch and the conversation header with previews on and off.
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Remote Control
Remote Control reaches CodeNomad from another device without an inbound port.
It is separate from direct --host access; neither falls back to the other.
browser ─TLS─▶ OpenTunnel relay (forwards ciphertext) ─▶ OpenTunnel SDK in the backend (TLS ends here)
─TCP─▶ remote-only loopback ingress ─▶ remote gate ─▶ the normal CodeNomad application
Transport
packages/remote-tunnelwraps@opentunnel/clientbehind CodeNomad-owned types. The server build bundles it with its resolved Effect copy intodist/remote-control/tunnel-runtime.js; never give the published server a runtime dependency on the private workspace package.- CodeNomad claims one random route (
codenomad-<hex>, persisted) on the device's shareddefaultidentity. OpenCode'sopencode pair --remoteand the OpenTunnel CLI use the same identity with their own routes. Stopping closes CodeNomad's bridge only and never callstunnel.remove(). - The relay can observe hostnames, connection timing and sizes. It cannot read
traffic. Impersonating the host requires a misissued certificate for the
tunnel hostname, which would appear in Certificate Transparency logs.
opentunnel.xyzis on the Public Suffix List, so other users' tunnels are cross-site; OpenCode's route on the same device is same-site, so mutations checkOriginrather than rely onSameSite. - First use provisions the identity and its certificate (about 30 seconds); the start request waits up to five minutes.
- Start records the choice in the registry file and only Stop clears it. A
launch after Start reconnects in the background (
manager.resume()) and issues no pairing code; shutdown, a fatal tunnel stop and a failed resume keep the choice, so the next launch retries. Only one backend per config directory resumes (remote-control.owner, live-PID lease replaced after a crash): OpenTunnel gives a route to one bridge and a contender retries until it takes over, so a second backend would otherwise silently serve the paired devices. An explicit Start always proceeds. Settings polls the status only while the tunnel is (re)connecting, keeps paired devices listed while it is off and offers Stop after a failed resume. - Keep OpenTunnel's per-route PROXY protocol off: the ingress expects plain HTTP.
Admission
server/src/remote-control/:
ingress.tsmarks every accepted socket as remote before any request is parsed and routes requests into the same Fastify application, with the local listener's timeouts (no request timeout, 72 s keep-alive). Its only WebSocket endpoints are web previews:gate.tsadmitRemoteUpgrade()parses the target as the preview proxy does, then the manager hands the socket to the application's path-preview upgrade handler, never to the shared upgrade event. Every other upgrade gets 404.request-origin.tsis the only authority for local privileges:isLocalRequest()requires a loopback peer and a non-ingress socket.gate.tsruns before CORS, authentication and routing. It requires the exact tunnelHostand the publicOriginon mutations, and strips forwarding headers. It accepts origin-form targets only (no absolute-form, leading//or fragment, which the router would reinterpret) and judges the path the router routes (server/routed-path.ts). It denies host-only paths: login and token bootstrap, Remote Control management, remote windows/proxy, SideCars, previews and the automation bridge. A live/previews/<token>/…capability is admitted without a device cookie or publicOrigin(its sandboxed document sends neither) while the host's Web previews switch is on, the default:devices.tsstores only the opt-out,PUT /api/remote-control/previewsis host-only, and turning it off also closes live preview WebSockets. Remote/api/metareportspreviewsUnavailablewhile it is off, so the UI hides its preview entry. Static UI bundle files stay public, as on local listeners, because browsers fetch the PWA manifest without cookies. Every other path requires a paired device. Refusals close the connection, because an unread body would otherwise break the client's next keep-alive request.- A remote
/api/auth/statuswithout a valid device reportspairingRequired. The recovery dialog then explains how to pair again instead of offering password login, keeping the page and its drafts. Pairing from another tab restores it on the next check. devices.tsissues one five-minute, single-use pairing code. The link carries it in the fragment, never in the query or a log. It stores SHA-256 hashes of device credentials and expires devices after 30 days without use.__Host-codenomad_deviceisSecure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax. Revocation, and replacement of the least recently seen device at the 32-device limit, also destroy that device's open connections. The registry file is written only once Remote Control is used.- Remote devices authenticate even with
--dangerously-skip-auth, and the local session cookie is never accepted on the ingress. - A desktop CodeNomad pairs as a device: pasting a pairing link into Add server
saves only the tunnel origin and opens the remote window once on the link
(
lib/remote-pairing-link.ts). The profile keeps TLS verification on, since a Tauri TLS-proxy window uses an incognito store without the device cookie. The code is never stored with the server; re-pairing a saved server reuses its window storage, which keeps the device cookie across launches. Covered bytests/browser/remote-server-pairing.test.ts.
Validation
remote-surface.test.tsdrives the realcreateHttpServerthrough the ingress. It covers unpaired access, pairing,Origin/Hostchecks, host-only paths including encoded ones, loopback privileges, spoofed headers, upgrades, web previews and their switch, revocation of a live stream, skipped local auth and tunnel failure.manager.test.tscovers resuming after a restart, Stop, never-started installations, failed resumes and backends sharing a configuration;owner-lease.test.tsthe lease;tests/browser/remote-control-settings.test.tsthe settings panel after a failed, skipped or slow resume and across a reconnect.scripts/remote-control-live.test.ts(opt-in,CODENOMAD_REMOTE_CONTROL_LIVE=1) repeats the flow through the hosted relay, using a throwaway profile and data directory, and deletes that tunnel afterwards. It creates a public, certificate-logged hostname.- The packaged smoke test imports the bundled runtime with the packaged Node.
Agent conventions
- Remote Access settings put Remote Control first. Direct/LAN access (listening mode, server password, reachable addresses) sits in one collapsed disclosure that opens by itself while the server listens beyond localhost. Its texts refer to direct connections only, because Remote Control pairs devices and needs neither a password nor an open port. It uses the shared
.settings-disclosure(styles/components/settings-disclosure.css). - The tunnel runtime (
build:remote-tunnel) keeps its own backend-side Effect runtime, separate from OpenCode's native plugin graph. Ingress sockets are remote by membership: grant local privileges only throughisLocalRequest()/isLoopbackRequest(), never peer addresses or headers. The resume lease lives inowner-lease.ts; never auto-start an installation that was not started. Run the Validation tests above when changing the transport.