* feat(kap-server): add remote control device deletion
* fix(kap-server): coordinate with the local tunnel before deleting this machine's device
Co-authored-by: liruifengv <liruifeng1024@gmail.com>
* feat(kap-server): add remote control device management
* feat(remote-control): tag share URLs with the caller's platform source
The share link's from query parameter was hardcoded to kimi_code_cli, so
links created by the desktop app were mislabeled as CLI traffic.
buildRemoteControlUrl now takes the source explicitly and
RemoteControlOptions carries it as urlSource; kap-server threads
hostIdentity.platform through, so desktop hosts produce
from=kimi_code_desktop while CLI hosts keep from=kimi_code_cli.
* fix(kap-server): stop the local tunnel when the current device is deactivated or deleted
The device management routes only called the cloud API. When the target
device is the machine itself, the local tunnel kept running: after the
relay drops it, the client reconnects and re-registers, so the device
came back online (or was recreated after a delete) and the local status
never returned to off.
After a successful cloud deactivate/delete of the current device, the
routes now also disable the local tunnel manager.
* feat(kap-server)!: drop the remote-control device delete route
Device removal is collapsed to a single deactivate verb: the desktop UI
deactivates devices instead of deleting them, so the DELETE
/remote-control/devices/{id} route and the device client's deleteDevice
go away before this API ever ships.
* feat(kap-server): carry the lock holder in the already-running error
The enable route now returns the RemoteControlAlreadyRunningError holder
(pid, local origin, device id, url, started_at) in the error envelope's
details, documented with a details schema, so desktop can render a
structured conflict state instead of the raw message.
* feat(kap-server): expose the lock conflict in the remote control status
The manager now surfaces the holder when its last enable error is an
already-running lock conflict, and GET /remote-control returns it as a
structured conflict field, so clients can present the conflict state
proactively instead of parsing the error message.
* feat(kap-server): resolve the remote control lock conflict live in status
GET /remote-control now re-inspects the machine lock whenever the
manager is off: a live holder is reported as the conflict even without
a prior enable attempt in this process, and a stored conflict plus its
error text are dropped once the holder's process is gone. Panel state
refreshes such as after device deactivation now reflect reality.
* feat(kap-server): wait for the lock holder to release on current-device deactivation
When the deactivated device is the machine's own and the lock is held
by another live process (e.g. a CLI instance whose tunnel the relay is
about to terminate with user_requested), the route now polls the lock
for up to two seconds before responding, so a client's immediately
following status read sees the settled conflict-free state.
* style(kap-server): silence promise-executor-return in lock release wait
* test(remote-control): pass urlSource in the close-reason cases
* feat(kap-server)!: register remote control devices with the host product name
* refactor(cli): source the remote control identity from app constants
* fix(remote-control): make starts cancellable and harden logout cleanup
* fix(remote-control): close the remaining cancellation and invalidation races
* fix(kap-server): sweep remote control cleanup once more after logout
* docs: note the lock-release failure of remote control deactivation
* fix(remote-control): key cloud sessions by credential and settle cancelled starts
* fix(kap-server): block remote control starts during logout and serialize tunnel toggles
* fix(kap-server): gate local starts during current-device deactivation
* fix(kap-server): match active tunnel ids on deactivation and re-clear sessions after logout
* fix(kap-server): serialize Kimi logouts, harden lock cleanup, and whitelist device fields
* fix(remote-control): abort pending handshakes on close and answer logout before tunnel teardown
* fix(remote-control): cancel enables that are still queued behind a pending disable
* fix(kap-server): recognize foreign logout gates and retry post-logout tunnel teardown
* fix(remote-control): verify the machine lock after disable and recheck deactivation
* feat(kap-server): export loadOrCreateServerToken for host token provisioning
* fix(remote-control): exit the web server when the relay takes the device offline
* test(cli): satisfy the remote-control handle contract in tui web tests
* fix(remote-control): pick credential slot and relay from login region
Global login stores tokens in kimi-code-env-*.json and should use
code-rc.kimi.ai; Remote Control always read kimi-code.json and
code-rc.kimi.com. Resolve both from the persisted oauth ref.
* fix(telemetry): skip the dead global collector and keep shutdown alive
The global collector host has no DNS. Drop it from the region profile and
skip the send instead of falling back to the mainland endpoint. Keep the
shutdown timeout timer referenced so a failed flush cannot exit before the
TUI hands the process to the foreground server.
* fix(remote-control): require explicit relay origin and drop hardcoded .com defaults
The Remote Control HTTP tunnel validated each base64 message with a
backtracking regular expression. Requests larger than ~3.5MB (base64
~5MB) exhausted the V8 Irregexp backtracking stack and threw
RangeError, which the catch-all mapped to a 400 with an empty body,
surfacing as a generic connection failure on the web client.
Replace the regex with an O(n) character check, reject oversize
requests from the base64 length before decoding, and map non-SyntaxError
failures to 502 instead of 400.
* feat(remote-control): compress textual tunnel responses with gzip
* fix(remote-control): honor explicit gzip exclusion over accept-encoding wildcard
* fix(remote-control): skip gzip for 206 responses and vary by accept-encoding
* fix(remote-control): compress tunnel responses off the event loop
* fix(remote-control): vary identity responses and version compressed etags
* fix(remote-control): drop etags from gzipped tunnel responses
* fix(remote-control): release the lock before reporting off and re-read the server token per forward
* fix(remote-control): pass the token provider through the manager
